Whistlebusters.org                         
Press Release, February 1, 2006

We are a group of current and former CSU faculty and staff, all of us former whistleblowers.  We have joined together to blow the whistle on the CSU whistleblower program.  Our combined experiences with this program, administered by the CSU Office of Employee Relations (CSU-OER), have led us to conclude that the CSU whistleblower program is fraught with the very problems that it is supposed to expose and eliminate: incompetence, bad faith, and gross mismanagement of taxpayer funds.

The wasteful and harmful practices of the CSU-OER have persisted for years due to a lack of effective oversight by any agency within or outside the CSU system. Since 2000, CSU-OER personnel have expended millions of dollars in public funds on investigations, and on litigation and settlement costs, much of which could have been avoided given more competent and forthright management of the program.  All the while, by their own admission, CSU-OER managers have operated without a budget, and have yet to produce a single financial report that comprehensively tracks or analyzes their expenditures since the CSU whistleblower program's inception in 1999.  Given that the CSU-OER pays out substantial sums of taxpayer money, but does not engage in even the most basic financial analysis or reporting functions, it is difficult to see how they, or any supervisory body, could know if the program is living up to its charge to thoroughly investigate whistleblower complaints and eliminate government waste, or whether the program wastes more money than it saves.  Financial and other records obtained through public records requests strongly suggest the latter.  However, as explained below, economic waste is not the only serious problem with the CSU-OER’s management approach: their policies and practices have on the whole reflected a cynical disregard for the rights and interests of those who have taken on the greatest risks on behalf of the public’s interest: the whistleblowers themselves.

The Root of the Problem

CSU-OER personnel have, as a result of their poorly considered, and in some cases non-existent policies, helped to create conditions that almost inevitably lead to wasted taxpayer funds, and in all too many cases to serious personal and professional harm to individual whistleblowers.

Each year, the CSU-OER posts posters and forwards broadcast emails through the individual CSU campuses encouraging CSU employees to blow the whistle on fraud and waste.   The language is upbeat and compelling.  It is also contains several false representations, as described below.

1.  False Representation #1: Blowing the whistle at CSU is safe.

The CSU-OER's whistleblower recruitment literature conveys the idea that it is safe to blow the whistle at CSU.  In fact, CSU-OER personnel know that blowing the whistle at CSU is anything but safe: among other indicators, 38 whistleblowers have filed formal retaliation complaints since 2000.  In the aftermath of their complaints, many whistleblowers have been transferred, retired early, or have been forced out of their jobs.  Even more troubling, many whistleblowers end up filing lawsuits against CSU, most often to seek damages for injuries sustained in the course of being a CSU whistleblower; 6 whistleblower-related lawsuits against CSU are currently ongoing.

By failing to disclose to prospective whistleblowers the known risks, while representing to them that they will be safe, CSU-OER personnel are in effect engaging in a form of  "fraudulent inducement". The whistleblowers are encouraged to file a complaint but then end up harmed as a result.

2.   False Representation #2: Whistleblowers will be shielded from retaliation.  

The CSU-OER's whistleblower recruitment literature states that the whistleblower will be "shielded" from retaliation.  In fact, according to public records provided by the CSU-OER, that office has failed to implement any university-wide program to shield whistleblowers from retaliation, comparable to the universal, in-depth training programs and strict enforcement policies that shield CSU employees from other forms of harassment.  The virtual non-existence of an effective retaliation-prevention training program at CSU is confirmed in a recent letter of determination drafted by Vice Chancellor Jackie McClain, who oversees the CSU-OER. In her Dec. 19, 2005 letter to a whistleblower (obtained through a public records request), apparently referencing the alleged retaliator, Vice Chancellor McClain writes, “Appropriate action should, therefore, be taken by the campus to educate [the alleged retaliator] about her obligations under EO 822 and to prevent a similar occurrence in the future”. Later McClain writes, "I hope that one remedy is that the campus will educate [the alleged retaliator] about her responsibilities under EO 822".  Thus, more than 5 years after the inception of the whistleblower program at CSU, the protection of whistleblowers against retaliation remains a matter of “hope” in the mind of the CSU official who oversees the CSU-OER, and consists of educating individuals about their responsibilities after they have already been charged with retaliation.

By failing to implement any credible mechanism to shield whistleblowers from retaliation, the CSU-OER virtually guarantees that CSU employees who become whistleblowers will suffer harm. This leads to more retaliation complaints filed under E.O. 822, each of which must be investigated at substantial cost, followed in some cases by litigation, which leads to even greater costs to the taxpayer.

3.  False Representation #3: If you blow the whistle, the CSU will go to bat for you.

The CSU-OER's whistleblower recruitment literature reassures the potential whistleblower that the state will "go to bat" for them.  Sadly, the opposite is true.  Once a whistleblower has experienced retaliation, and has filed an E.O. 822 complaint, the relationship between CSU and the whistleblower turns immediately adversarial.  This is because the CSU-OER understands that an official finding of retaliation by them would (1) embarrass them by calling attention to the fact that they do virtually nothing to prevent retaliation, (2) put pressure on them, and on Vice Chancellor McClain, to discipline the retaliators, which could lead to further personnel problems including more lawsuits, and (3) entitle the whistleblower to substantial compensation for damages, which the CSU-OER would prefer to avoid paying.  All three problems are rendered moot, however, if the individual that the CSU-OER hires to carry out the E.O. 822 investigation happens to find that no "adverse employment action" against the whistleblower has occurred, or if it did occur, that the adverse action "could not be connected" to the whistleblower's filing of his or her complaint.

How often do CSU-OER's investigators find retaliation?  In 38 cases of retaliation reported to the CSU-OER under E.O. 822 since 2000, the investigators hired by the CSU-OER have found retaliation only 4 times.  In one case, an outside defense lawyer hired by the CSU-OER (Alan Zuckerman of Lewis, Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP) admitted to the whistleblower (M.C.) at the outset of his investigation that his client, CSU, would prefer that he find that no retaliation had occurred.  To his credit, Mr. Zuckerman thus admitted that he was subject to a conflict of interest.  At the conclusion of his investigation, Mr. Zuckerman reported to CSU that 13 of the 14 acts of retaliation alleged in the complaint, having begun immediately following the filing of the whistleblower's complaint, having never occurred before the filing of the complaint, and having continued over a period of a year following the filing of the complaint, nonetheless "could not be connected" to the filing of the complaint.  Mr. Zuckerman was paid $24,000 for his work for CSU in that case.  According to best available information, Alan Zuckerman’s firm has received more than $500,000 in fees from CSU for this and other legal work.

In hiring outside defense lawyers who are subject to a conflict of interest, rather than neutral investigators, the CSU-OER fails in its responsibility to the public, and especially to individual whistleblowers, to conduct thorough, neutral investigations of whistleblower retaliation complaints.   The incomplete and biased nature of the E.O. 822 investigations run by the CSU-OER has—of a certainty—led to several lawsuits against the CSU by whistleblowers who feel they were "sold out" by the process. In one case, CSU expended $727,000 in attorney’s fees fighting a whistleblower who sued to recover damages from the retaliation he experienced as a CSU whistleblower.  Such lawsuits, and the corresponding waste of taxpayer funds, could have been avoided.

4.  False Representation #4: The CSU-OER enforces whistleblower retaliation laws with harsh penalties.

The CSU-OER's whistleblower recruitment literature speaks of harsh penalties for retaliation, including $10,000 fines and one year in jail.  This language suggests that a significant deterrent exists, making it safer to blow the whistle.  In practice, however, the CSU-OER does not enforce whistleblower retaliation laws.  As previously mentioned, in the 38 retaliation complaints brought to the CSU-OER since 2000, only 4 cases of retaliation were found, and in only a single case did Vice Chancellor McClain dispense any disciplinary action.

Was at least that single disciplinary action particularly severe?  Evidently not.  Vice Chancellor McClain stated in a letter of determination that the disciplinary action had been carried out retroactively, that is, some unspecified disciplinary action had already been prescribed at a time predating the retaliation investigation entirely.  The nature of that disciplinary action was kept secret, but it involved neither a fine, jail time, or any perceptible change in the retaliator's duties or powers as a CSU Department Chair.  What is not secret is that that Chair was given the highest award that can be conferred upon a CSU professor by campus administrators at the next possible opportunity (the 2005 "Best Professor" award).

The CSU seems to be more interested in defending itself against claims that the CWPA has been violated than it is in protecting the rights of the whistleblowers themselves. Among the most troublesome aspects of the enforcement of the CWPA is that the CSU is allowed to investigate itself. No credible investigative pursuit can be conducted by the very entity charged with the violation.

5.  False Representation #5: The CSU-OER cares about whistleblowers.  

The overall tenor of the whistleblower recruitment process projects a concern for the whistleblowers. In informal conversations, most CSU whistleblowers report feeling crushed and demoralized by the process.  (According to a public records request, the CSU-OER has never polled whistleblowers about their level of satisfaction with the CSU-OER’s performance.)  Despite this, the CSU-OER director, Ms. Maria Santos, has stated that she is unwilling to assist in the creation of, or even to publicize the existence of, a grass-roots support network whose purpose is to help former whistleblowers recover from the psychological trauma of having been a CSU whistleblower.  

Perhaps the impediment to the formation of such a group from the CSU-OER's perspective is that any organization of CSU whistleblowers could mean further legal and/or public relations problems for the CSU-OER.


 Summary of the Problem

The CSU-OER recruits whistleblowers each year by suggesting that (1) "blowing the whistle is safe", whereas whistleblowers face grave personal and professional risks and the CSU-OER knows it; (2) "whistleblowers will be shielded from retaliation", whereas no credible program has been put into effect within the CSU to shield whistleblowers from retaliation; (3) "the state will go to bat for you", whereas upon filing a retaliation complaint, the whistleblower is immediately transformed into a potential legal problem for the university, and is dealt with accordingly; and (4) "retaliators will be dealt with harshly", whereas the CSU-OER reneges on enforcement of whistleblower retaliation laws.  The combined effects of the misrepresentations and the ineffective or non-existent policies of the CSU-OER are that large sums of taxpayer money are wasted, and whistleblowers, who have been fraudulently induced to identify waste and corruption in the CSU system, are subjected to serious personal and/or professional injury that could have been avoided.  These undesirable outcomes were clearly not the intent of the drafters of the California Whistleblower Protection Act as it applies to the California State University.  


What We Are Seeking

We hereby call upon the Trustees of the California State University to immediately suspend any new activities of the CSU whistleblower program, as administered by the CSU-OER, pending an investigation into its current policies and practices by the California Bureau of State Audits.

Our vision for improvements in the CSU whistleblower program includes five categories of changes:
  1. Disclosure.  The history of outcomes and risks associated with whistleblower claims filed at CSU should be quantitatively documented and clearly communicated to any prospective whistleblower at CSU (and to legislators, the public, the Trustees, etc.).   Regarding outcomes, whistleblowers should be informed as to what substantive corrective actions have resulted from previous whistleblower claims, so that they may judge whether filing a claim at CSU is worthwhile. Regarding risks, prospective whistleblowers should know the historical frequency of exposed identities, the frequency of reported retaliation vs. the frequency of findings of retaliation, types of disciplinary action taken against retaliators, the frequency of subsequent transfers/retirement/termination of whistleblowers, and the frequency and types of lawsuits filed by former whistleblowers against the CSU.

  2. Training.  If whistleblowers are to be told that they will be shielded from retaliation, a training program comparable to those created for sexual harassment and other types of workplace harassment should be developed and promulgated. This could be achieved by incorporating whistleblower retaliation information into the existing harassment training programs already required of current CSU employees.

  3. Impartial investigations.  Whistleblower and retaliation complaints should be investigated by panels (analogous to grand juries) made up of individuals with no financial or other stake in the outcome of the investigations.  A panel might include one or more members of the CSU faculty or staff, a professional auditor, a student, a representative of the Trustees, a labor lawyer, and so on. All of those who serve must demonstrate that service on the panel does not constitute any conflict of interest.

  4. Accountability and oversight.   The CSU whistleblower program should publish annual reports including outcomes (see item 1), expenditures, and analysis of cost effectiveness of the program.

  5. Whistleblower support.   CSU should establish an optional anonymous electronic exchange whereby current and former whistleblowers can make contact with each other to form a support network.  Specialized counseling services should also be made available to whistleblowers to cope with the difficulties arising from their grievance process.

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Prof. Maria Carreira, CSULB, Committee Chair
    carreiragfmc@hotmail.com
Carole Kosloski, formerly CSU Hayward
Prof. Suave Lobodzinski, CSULB
Leslie Markle, formerly CSULB
Prof. Walter Moore, CSULB (Emeritus)
David Ohton, CSU San Diego
Prof. Richard Runyon, CSULB